Introduction
During recent years, earned income tax credits have been introduced, or expanded, in a variety of developed nations. Focused on boosting labor supply and "making work pay", earned income tax credits are a form of work subsidy, available to low-wage workers. Frequently, another goal of earned income tax credits is to improve the welfare of children, and they are therefore typically more generous for working parents than working singles.
A notable difference between the earned income tax credits that have been implemented concerns the "phase-in" range. While the Belgian, Dutch, Finnish, and US credits have a range in which the value of the credit increases with earnings, the British and Irish programs become fully available at a certain threshold (Gradus 2001) .
1 Without a "phase-in" range, theory predicts that the effect on labor force participation for singles who are out of the labor force should be unambiguously positive, the effect on labor force participation for secondary earners who are out of the labor force should be unambiguously negative, and the effect on hours for those already in the labor force and earning over the threshold should be unambiguously negative.
Although several studies have shown that the US EITC boosts labor supply, evidence on the UK tax credit is more limited. This paper therefore considers the impact of the UK credit on labor supply and earnings, exploiting a 1999 increase in the credit as a natural experiment. In contrast to most EITC studies, which have used cross-sectional data, I make use of a fifteen-month panel dataset, making it possible to hold constant individual-specific factors, and identify the policy impact by comparing changes in the treatment group with changes in the control group.
To presage the results, I find increases in labor force participation, average hours and earnings for workers who are eligible for the tax credit, and a reduction in the probability that those eligible for the credit will say that they have a serious health problem. These results are robust to a range of different treatment and control groups;
and do not appear to be driven by other policy changes that occurred in 1999 and 2000.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background on the UK tax credit and briefly discusses the relevant literature. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy and results. Section 4 provides robustness checks, and the final section discusses the results and concludes. 1 The UK credit is also boosted by a small amount if the recipient works 30 hours or more.
Model and Background
Since 1971, Britain has had some form of means-tested benefit for adults with children who worked more than a certain number of hours per week (Dilnot and McCrae 1999) . This has variously been known as the Family Income Supplement , the Family Credit , the Working Families Tax Credit (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) and, most recently, the Working Tax Credit. Due to the ever-changing nomenclature of the program, this paper will simply refer to it as the "UK tax credit".
British tax credits differ from the US EITC in five major respects. First, as has been mentioned above, the UK credit has no phase-in range. The credit is unavailable to those working below 16 hours, and fully available to those working 16 hours or more, with a small additional credit amount available to those who work 30 hours or more.
Second, the phase-out range is substantially steeper (the effective marginal tax rates in the phase-out range after the 1999 reform was at least 55 percent; higher than the top marginal tax rate in the UK at the time). Third, while the US has made a small EITC payment available to childless workers since 1994, UK tax credits were only extended to those without children in 2003. 2 In 1999-2000, the years that this paper focuses on, UK tax credits were unavailable to childless adults -furthermore, the UK tax credit system also provided a generous childcare tax credit. Fourth, while over 99 percent of US EITC recipients obtain their credit at the end of the tax year (US Treasury 2003), UK recipients chiefly obtain the credit through their pay packet, with the amount based on their earnings over the previous three months. Indeed, since April 2000 many recipients -and most lone parents -have been paid the credit in this manner. 3 And fifth, the levels of welfare in the UK are on a par with the value of the tax credit. For example, after the October 1999 reforms, a single woman with two children under 10 would have been entitled to income support of £101.20 if she worked less than 16 hours per week; or a tax credit of £92.00 if she worked 16 hours or more, but earned below £90 (working would also entitle her to a 70 percent rebate on childcare costs). Because the timing of the increase in welfare coincided perfectly with the increase in the tax credit, it is likely that 2 For more detail on the 2003 tax credit reforms, see Brewer (2003) . 3 Since April 2000, the only exceptions to the rule that the credit must be paid through the employee's pay packet are for applicants who are not employed (the credit continues to be paid out for some time after termination of employment), for the self-employed, and in situations where the non-working partner in a couple claimed the credit. The latter is the most important exception, since the majority of couples had the credit paid to the non-working partner. The change which this paper will focus upon is a significant increase in the credit, which took place on October 5, 1999. The new tax credit was more generous than its predecessor in five main respects :
5
• it increased the basic credit from £48.80 to £52.30 per week;
• it increased the per-child credit for children under 11 from £14.85 to £19.85 per week;
• it increased the threshold before earnings began to taper off from £80.65 to £90 per week;
• it reduced the taper rate from 70 percent to 55 percent; 6 and
• it included a childcare credit of 70 percent of actual childcare costs up to £150 per week.
Additionally, at the same time as Britain increased the tax credit, it also boosted out-ofwork benefits for families with one or more children aged under 11. Since the timing was coincident with the increase in the tax credit, this paper will not attempt to disentangle the two reforms. However, it is worth noting that the labor force participation effect that might be expected to occur from boosting in-work benefits alone is larger than the labor force participation effect one might expect given an increase in both in-work and out-ofwork benefits.
As administrative data show, the October 1999 changes prompted a substantial increase in the number of tax credit recipients and the average credit amount (Inland Revenue 2003) . Figure 2 shows the number of tax credit recipients, while Figure 3 shows the average credit amount. In both graphs, the shaded region denotes the duration of the panel that will be used to analyze the changes. Over this fifteen-month period (March 1999 to May 2000 , the number of tax credit recipients rose by 29 percent (from 821,300 to 1,061,400), while the average credit amount rose by 16 percent (from £62.99 to £73.28). However, while there was no discernible increase in takeup rates between when 5 The October 1999 reform also shifted the administration of the tax credit from the Benefits Agency to Inland Revenue. 6 The taper rate for the UK tax credit applied to earnings after income tax and payroll tax (known in the UK as the national insurance contribution) had been deducted. For a worker in the phase-out range whose annual earnings were below the lower earnings limit for both payroll and income taxes ($3432 per year in 1999-2000) the effective marginal tax rate was simply the taper rate (70% before October 5, 1999, 55% thereafter). For this worker, the reduction in the effective marginal tax rate would simply have been 15% (70%-55%). But for a worker in the phase out range who was subject to the 10% payroll tax and income taxes, the effective marginal tax rate in 1999-2000 would have been {(0.1+income tax rate)+(1-0.1-income tax rate)*taper rate}. Where these other taxes applied, the reduction in the effective marginal tax rate arising from the 15% reduction in the taper rate would have been somewhat less than 15%. For example, if the individual's marginal income tax rate was 10%, the reduction would have been 12% (76%-64%).
after the credit increase was announced in the March 1998 budget statement and when it was implemented in October 1999, this does not necessarily mean that there was no anticipation effect, since the March 1998 announcement might nonetheless have had some impact on labor supply. What effect should we expect these changes to have on labor supply? Bearing in mind the differences between the UK and US EITCs that have been discussed above, one possible answer is to consider evidence from changes in the US EITC. Eissa and Liebman (1996) use a differences-in-differences approach to analyze the 1987 increase in the US EITC, and find that it led to a 2.8 percentage point increase in the relative participation rates of single women with children, but had no effect on the hours of those already in the labor force. Meyer (2002) charts changes in labor force participation over the period 1986-2000, and concludes similarly that the credit boosted labor supply on the participation margin, but had no significant effect on the hours margins for low-wage workers. Meyer looks at a variety of demographic groups, but concludes that the EITC primarily affected single women. Exploring whether this effect was due to the EITC or to welfare reform, Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) model the impact of both tax and welfare changes, and conclude that most of the increase in labor force participation was due to tax changes.
Several US studies suggest that the EITC may lower labor force participation for secondary earners, in circumstances where one adult is already working. This could be due either to the income effect (which would apply to all recipient households), or to the substitution effect (which would apply to households in the phase-out range). Analyzing the negative income tax experiments of the 1970s, Hausman (1985) concludes the income effect was significant, and could lead to a decrease in labor supply. Comparing labor force participation of low-skill and high-skill married women, Ellwood (2000) finds that EITC expansions over the period 1986-99 reduced the labor supply of married women in EITC-eligible families by between 3 and 7 percentage points. And comparing low-skill married couples with children to low-skill childless couples over the period 1984-96, Eissa and Hoynes (2004) conclude that boosting the EITC reduced wives' labor supply by 1 percentage point, which they attribute primarily to the income effect.
What is the effect on net welfare of raising the EITC? Leigh (2004) finds that increases in the EITC are associated with a fall in pre-tax hourly wages for low-skilled workers -since an increase in labor supply drives down the equilibrium wage. Given the apparent finding that labor supply rises and wages fall, what is the net impact on wellbeing of an EITC increase? Using variation from US state EITCs, Neumark and Wascher (2001) find that states which introduce or increase an EITC raise the income-to-needs ratio for poor families. Similarly in Canada, Michalopoulos, Robins and Card (2005) study a randomly assigned EITC experiment, and conclude that the program had a strong positive effect on both employment and earnings. Yet because the UK tax credit could potentially lower the equilibrium wage for low-skilled workers, it will be important to analyze its impact not only on labor supply, but also on earnings.
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Evidence on UK tax credits is more limited, but rapidly burgeoning. Using structural modeling, , Gregg et al (1999) , and Paull et al (2000) predict that the 1999 reform should lead to a 1½-2½ percentage point increase in the employment rate of single mothers, while and Gregg et al (1999) predict that the labor force participation rates for married women should fall. 7 Note that this is still an imperfect measurement of the effect of the policy change on earnings, since if workers eligible for the credit and workers ineligible for the credit work in the same occupations, then an EITC-induced increase in labor supply will drive down the hourly wage for both eligibles and ineligibles. In this instance, comparing the gross weekly earnings of eligibles and ineligibles might lead the researcher to overestimate of the impact of the policy on the welfare of eligibles (and ignore the detrimental effect on ineligibles). 8 For a careful comparison of these three studies, see Blundell and Reed (2000) .
This study presents a straightforward natural experiment, focusing on only the 1999 tax credit reform. It differs from existing studies in that it focuses on a variety of treatment and control groups, and analyzes a broad range of outcomes, including labor force participation, the probability of working each number of hours from 1 to 50, total earnings, and the probability that an individual will admit to having a health problem that affects employment.
Empirical Strategy and Results
In order to analyze the impact of the WFTC, I use data from a special five-quarter longitudinal sample of the Quarterly Labour Force Survey. 9 The LFS is a survey similar in nature to the US Current Population Survey, though with a somewhat smaller sample size. 10 A strategy akin to differences-in-differences is employed, comparing outcomes in the two quarterly surveys before the change (March to August 1999) with outcomes in the two quarterly surveys after the change (December to May 2000). However, unlike a standard differences-in-differences approach, I take advantage of the panel structure of the data to include an individual fixed effect term, so the results are identified only from changes in individuals' behavior, not from shifts in the composition of the sample. Since the tax credit increase occurred in October 1999, the survey conducted from September to November 1999 is omitted from the analysis. All respondents in the five-quarter longitudinal dataset were first observed in the March 1999 quarter. In total, 98.9 percent also answered the survey in the last quarter (May 2000), and 96.7 percent answered the survey in all four of the quarters used in this study (March 1999 , August 1999 , December 2000 and May 2000 . Non-response bias is addressed through the use of longitudinal weights (for more detail on the methodology used to create these weights, see Clarke and Tate 1999; Office of National Statistics 2003).
Five treatment-control pairings are identified:
• parents vs. childless adults;
• parents with predicted earnings below the median vs. childless adults with predicted earnings below the median; 9 The dataset is filed in the UK Data Archive as Study Number 4303 (2nd edition, May 2003). 10 The sample is further reduced for earnings questions, since these are asked in only Wave 1 and Wave 5, and in such a manner that the respondent has the opportunity to opt out of this part of the survey. Although this could potentially bias estimates of the impact of the October 1999 tax credit reform on earnings, the extent of this bias is limited through the inclusion of individual fixed effects.
• single mothers vs. single women without children;
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• non-single mothers vs. non-single women without children; and
• non-single fathers vs. non-single men without children.
In each case, the sample is restricted to prime age adults (those aged 25-59) who are not self-employed. Children are defined as dependent children aged under 16, or aged 16-18 and in full-time education (the survey question correspondents to the eligibility requirements for the tax credit). Since tax credit rules treat married and de facto couples in a similar manner, I group both together -rather than separating married and unmarried parents, as is more typical with US studies. Table 1 presents summary statistics from Wave 1 for those without children (the control group in the first specification) and with children (treatment group). Those with children tend to be younger than their childless counterparts, and to work slightly fewer hours (conditional on being employed), but the employment rates, gross weekly incomes and net weekly incomes of the two groups are otherwise quite similar. In the case of continuous outcomes, I use a fixed effects OLS specification.
Where the outcome is binary, the two possible estimation methods are a fixed effects logit model, and a fixed effects OLS model (since fixed effects probit and tobit are both known to be biased). I opt here for the latter, though the results are not qualitatively different when the former is used instead. Note that since this is a person fixed effects specification, the impact of the reform on hours and earnings is estimated only for those who were in the workforce both before and after October 1999. Appendix 1 compares the results from this fixed effects specification with two alternative models -a simple differences-in-differences estimator, and a matched differences-in-differences estimatorand finds similar results for the outcomes of hours worked and gross income. Table 2 presents the results from the first regression specification, using all parents as the treatment group, and adults without children as the control group. Making the tax credit more generous appears to have led to a 1 percent rise in the relative employment rate of those in the treatment group, a 1.3 hour rise in average weekly hours, a 2.5 percent relative rise in the probability that those in the treatment group would work 16 hours or more per week, and a 3.1 percent relative rise in the probability of working 30 hours or more per week. Relative to the control group, gross earnings rose by 4.6 percent, while net earnings by 3.3 percent. For the full sample, an increase in the tax credit had a negative (though not significant) effect on the extent to which an individual was likely to report a health problem, or to say that that problem limited the kind of work he or she could do. This suggests that self-reported health may perhaps be endogenous to the economic opportunities provided to individuals. 86 Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, in parentheses. Specifications including work hours are restricted to those in employment. Earnings are combined weekly earnings from main job and any secondary job. Post-tax earnings take into account income taxes and tax credits. "Treat" denotes individuals in the treatment group, while "After" denotes observations after October 1999.
In Table 2 , the only hours of work specifications tested are the probability of working 16 hours or more and the probability of working 30 hours or more. To gain a fuller picture across the hours distribution, I test the effect of the reform on the probability of working each number of hours from 1 to 50. Unlike Table 2 Note: Estimates show the effect of the tax credit reform on the probability that the individual will work a given number of hours or more.
Next, I confine the sample to those most likely to be affected by the reform.
Choosing only those with low earnings would be to select on the dependent variable. So instead, I first run a regression of log weekly earnings in the March 1999 quarter (prior to the tax credit reform) on a set of demographic characteristics which would not have been affected by the reform: sex, age, age 2 , race dummies, education dummies, plus interactions between education and age, and between education and sex. Using this, I
then predict each person's earnings, and restrict the sample to those whose earnings are in the lower half of the predicted earnings distribution. Table 3 presents summary statistics for the predicted poor without children (control group for this specification) and with children (treatment group), as measured in Wave 1. Those with children tend to be younger than their childless counterparts, less likely to be in employment (by a margin of 7 percentage points), likely to work fewer hours (conditional on being employed), and to have lower gross and net weekly earnings.
On gender and education, the two groups are quite similar. Overall, while the two groups are reasonably alike, the gap in labor market outcomes between the treatment and control groups is more sizeable for the predicted poor than it was for the full sample. Table 4 shows the results of estimating equation (1), but with the sample restricted to the predicted poor. Among this group, the effect of the reform is approximately the same as for the full sample, though somewhat less precisely estimated.
For those with sub-median predicted earnings, the 1999 tax credit reform boosted relative employment rates, hours, and earnings for the treatment group. As might be expected, the magnitude of the effect on hours and earnings seems to be larger for the predicted poor than in the full sample. 86 Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, in parentheses. Specifications including work hours are restricted to those in employment. Earnings are combined weekly earnings from main job and any secondary job. Post-tax earnings take into account income taxes and tax credits. "Treat" denotes individuals in the treatment group, while "After" denotes observations after October 1999. Sample is restricted to those whose predicted individual earnings in Wave 1 (based on a regression of earnings on sex, age, age 2 , race dummies, education dummies, interactions between education and age, and interactions between education and sex) are below the median in the sample (£245 per week). Table 5 shows results for the last three specifications -single women, non-single women, and non-single men. While the standard errors are higher -in some cases making them statistically indistinguishable from zero -the point estimates are quite similar across the three groups. Together, these findings suggest that the 1999 reform boosted the employment probabilities, hours, and weekly earnings for single women, and for both partners within couples.
The positive impact of the reform on the labor force participation and hours of non-single women (Panel B) may at first blush appear difficult to reconcile with the findings of natural experiment-style studies on the US EITC (Ellwood 2000; Eissa and Hoynes 2004) , and structural studies of the effect of the 1999 reforms to the UK tax credit . The most likely answer is that the reduction in the taper rate and the higher childcare tax credit had a sufficiently large positive effect on the hours of non-single women that it offset any negative effect on labor supply of increasing the maximum credit amount. In a context where secondary earners already face high marginal tax rates, it should not be surprising that a reform of this type can improve work incentives for partnered mothers as well as for single mothers. In the case of non-single men, the effects are mostly insignificant, with a positive effect on gross earnings, but not on net earnings, and a positive effect on the probability of working more than 30 hours that is only significant at the 10 percent level. However, the results in Panel C do indicate that the reform did not have a negative effect on the labor force participation of nonsingle men. 85 Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, in parentheses. Specifications including work hours are restricted to those in employment. Earnings are combined weekly earnings from main job and any secondary job. Post-tax earnings take into account income taxes and tax credits. "Treat" denotes individuals in the treatment group, while "After" denotes observations after October 1999.
Robustness Checks
The years 1999 and 2000 were busy ones for social policy reformers in the UK government. In addition to boosting the tax credit in October 1999, Britain introduced a national minimum wage on 13 April 1999, reduced the bottom tax rate on 6 April 2000, and made various changes to the National Insurance Contribution Scheme on 6 April 1999 and 6 April 2000. Might these have biased the results observed above?
One simple answer is to say that, given that both the treatment and control groups had similar weekly earnings at the outset, these other policy changes might have affected γ (the coefficient on the "After October 1999" indicator variable), but should not have affected the coefficient of interest, β (the coefficient on the interaction between the "After October 1999" indicator variable and the indicator variable for having children).
Another approach is to gauge the potential bias from studies focusing on these other reforms. In the case of the minimum wage, there is evidence to suggest that the bias was pretty insignificant. The group most likely to earn the minimum wage are young workers, and those aged under 25 were excluded from the foregoing regression results.
Moreover, in an analysis of the effect of the minimum wage, Stewart (2004) looks at both adults and youths, and finds no adverse employment effects from its introduction.
Concentrating at aged care homes, Machin and Wilson (2004) find a modest negative impact on employment.
A more parsimonious way of testing whether the results were affected by these policy reforms is to restrict the sample. Dickens & Manning (2002) find that virtually all the effects of the minimum wage increase had taken place within two months of its introduction. Therefore, by excluding surveys taken before the rise (March 1999) , and in the subsequent two months (April and May 1999), it should be possible to essentially purge the results of any "minimum wage effect".
The tax and national insurance changes were more complex, but as with the minimum wage, it is difficult to see prima facie why they ought to have had a differential effect upon the treatment and control groups. Adam and Reed (2003) provide a detailed account of the national insurance changes, but the essence of the reforms is the following.
In April 1999, the levels of weekly earnings at which employers start paying national insurance contributions were aligned with the weekly level of the income tax personal allowance; and a "kink" was removed from the employee and employer national insurance contribution schedule. In April 2000, the earnings threshold for employee national insurance contributions was increased slightly. The taxation changes involved the introduction of a 10 percent tax rate in April 1999 (though this was unlikely to have affected those working sufficient hours to be eligible for the tax credit, it could nonetheless have induced an increase in labor supply among low-skill workers in the control group); and a reduction in the next lowest marginal tax rate from 23 percent to 22 percent in April 2000.
In the same manner as for the minimum wage, we can see whether that the foregoing results were driven by the tax and national insurance changes by restricting the sample to a single tax year. Since survey responses from the 1998-99 tax year have already been removed from the sample, this merely involves excluding surveys taken after 6 April 2000. The restricted sample, purged of possible minimum wage, national insurance, and taxation effects, is a "before" period of June to August 1999, and an "after" period of December 1999 to 5 April 2000.
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Unfortunately, because earnings and health questions are only asked in the first and last quarters of the survey, this means that we can no longer explore the effect of the tax credit changes on wages or health status. In addition, because the results rely on within-person variation, removing some of the surveys restricts the number of degrees of freedom in the model, which should, ceteris paribus, reduce the precision of the estimates. Table 6 presents the results of this specification, for the first specification (comparing prime-age adults with children to prime-age adults without children). Here, the coefficient on being employed ceases to be significant (though remains positive), while the coefficients on total weekly hours, working 16 hours or more, and working 30 hours or more, all remain positive and significant. 
Discussion and Conclusion
Using a variety of treatment-control pairings, and relying only on withinindividual variation, the 1999 tax credit reforms appear to have had a positive impact on labor force participation, and on hours worked. Comparing parents with childless adults, the policy led to a 1 percentage point boost in labor force participation, and a 1.1 hour increase in the working week for those already in the labor force. Hours increased across the distribution, with no evidence of bunching at the 16-hour and 30-hour thresholds.
Across family types, the tax credit appeared to have increased hours worked for eligible single women, as well as for both men and women in couples. The positive hours effect is robust to purging the sample of the possible effect of the UK minimum wage, tax changes, and national insurance contribution changes. The policy also boosted pre-tax earnings by 4 percent (though it did not have a statistically significant impact on post-tax earnings), and may even have reduced the fraction of people who said that they had a serious health problem, or that a health problem prevented them from working. Family Resources Survey) and the fact that the present paper uses a natural experiment approach, it is probably not surprising that the results presented here differ somewhat.
In the case of single mothers, the results in this paper are also smaller than the two natural experiment studies that focused on this group alone. Gregg and Harkness (2003) found that reforms to the tax credit brought about a 5 percentage point increase in single mothers' employment rates over the period 1998 , while Francesconi and Van der Klaauw (2004 found that tax credit reforms over the period 1991-2001 led to a 5.5 percentage point increase in the labor force participation rate for single mothers, with most of the effect occurring in 1999. Although it is difficult to compare studies using different data sources and measuring effects over different time horizons, one possibility way of reconciling the evidence is that there was some degree of anticipation of the reforms in the pre-period.
What can the effects observed in this paper tell us about how the poor respond to changing economic incentives? One factor to note is that despite the fact that both welfare and the tax credit were boosted in October 1999, the reform nonetheless had a positive effect on labor supply. While theory suggests that the difference between welfare and in-work benefits will be a key factor determining the employment effect, the stigma associated with welfare may be such that a comparable increase in both welfare and the tax credit will nonetheless induce a rise in labor supply.
Another important feature to note about the 1999 tax credit increase is the finding that average hours for those already in the labor force increased. As Dilnot and McCrae (1999, 15) observed before the reform took effect, "The apparently common-sense assumption that lowering tapers must be good is far from obviously true; it may be better to have higher taper rates affecting a smaller group." My results show that the combined effect of a lower taper rate and a more generous maximum credit was to boost hours for those already in employment. Since theory unambiguously predicts that a more generous maximum credit amount should reduce hours for those in employment, it seems likely that the increase in hours can be ascribed to the lower taper rate. This suggests that lowering the taper rate was indeed a sensible reform, despite the fact that more people now found themselves in the phase-out range. For those designing tax credits in other countries, lower phase-out rates should be preferred.
Lastly, a more general point is in order. The UK tax credit is different in many respects to the US EITC. Yet both nonetheless appear to have had a positive impact on labor supply. Carefully designing tax credit programs is important, but it is useful to see that positive employment effects can flow from programs that are structurally quite different from one another.
Appendix 1: Specification Checks
The empirical findings presented in this paper are based on individual fixed effects regressions. Here, I compare these findings with two alternative specifications: a simple differences-in-differences estimate, and an estimate in which I calculate a matched propensity score for the treatment and control groups, and then calculate the differencesin-differences estimate by weighting each observation by the inverse of its propensity score. Both are calculated for the sample including all adults, and the propensity score is calculated using local linear regression matching, with the variables included in the probit model being gender, age, years of education, race (four categories), and a dummy for single/non-single.
Appendix Table 1 presents three sets of results -the individual fixed effects specification shown in Table 2 (reproduced here for ease of comparability), a differencesin-differences estimate, and a matched differences-in-differences estimate. Note that in the absence of attrition from the panel, the estimates in Panels A and B should be identical. However, with 3.3 percent of respondents failing to answer the survey in one or more quarters, it is possible that these two estimation methods may have diverged.
The results from Panels A, B and C produce similar results for total hours and earnings, but the positive effect on employment does not recur in either of the differences-in-differences specification. A positive effect on working more than 30 hours is found in the individual fixed effects and matched differences-in-differences specifications, but not in the simple differences-in-differences specification; while the positive effect on working more than 16 hours is found only in the matched differencesin-differences specification. Unlike the individual fixed effects specification, the two differences-in-differences specifications also do not suggest any significant difference on the health reporting outcomes.
Which set of results should be preferred? The advantage of the individual fixed effects specification over differences-in-differences is that it is possible to distinguish between changes that are due to compositional effects and changes that are due to individuals changing their behavior. For example, the findings in column 1 show that persons in the treatment group were more likely to begin working than those in the control group (Panel A), but the average change in the employment rate of the two groups was statistically indistinguishable (Panels B and C). Together, these findings indicate that the attrition rate of employed (non-employed) persons from the treatment group (control group) was higher than from the control group. While it is possible that this attrition was non-random, to the extent that it was related to observable characteristics in the attritors, it will be captured by the longitudinal weights. For this reason, the paper focuses on the individual fixed effects specification.
